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by Governor Rick Scott.1 After being criticized for violating the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Governor Scott
joined other Republican state politicians facing legal backlash from laws
that courts have determined legislators intentionally enacted to
discriminate against African-Americans attempting to participate in the
political process or vote.2 During the past two years, courts have held that
Texas, North Carolina, and Ohio practiced racial gerrymandering in an
unlawful attempt to disenfranchise African-American voters.3
Civil rights experts contend the verdict against Florida’s voterestoration process may refocus the nation’s eyes on the connections
between voting rights, race, and Republican politics.4 Judge Walker
viewed the arbitrary nature of the Florida voter-restoration scheme as part
of an expanding trend in which Republican partisans—because of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s rollback of federal voting protections for racial
minorities—are now trying to utilize voter identification and legislative
gerrymandering to create a permanent electoral advantage.5 As Judge
Walker stated, “This court is not blind to nationwide trends in which the
spigot to access the United States’ most ‘precious’ and ‘fundamental’
right, the right to vote, depends on who controls the levers of power.”6
Further, Judge Walker declared in his order, “[t]hat spigot is turned on or
off depending on whether politicians perceive they will benefit from the
expansion or contraction of the electorate.”7 Judge Walker’s opinion sends
the message that the right to vote is so precious that the government should
protect it regardless of which political party has access to power.
Part I of this Article challenges the United States to reevaluate and
protect the fundamental right to vote against racial targeting. Part II
contends that the U.S. Supreme Court should reject the belief that race
could be justified as a factor in legislative gerrymandering because race is
too sensitive a factor to be considered when gerrymandering. Part II also
argues that any consideration of race taints the equality principle, and the
Court should reverse its 2001 holding in Easley v. Cromartie.8 Part II also
1. Patrick Jonsson, More than a third of all US ex-cons who can't vote live
in Florida. Why?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.cs
monitor.com/USA/Justice/2018/0212/More-than-a-third-of-all-US-ex-cons-who
-can-t-vote-live-in-Florida.-Why [https://perma.cc/GC9C-4NS3].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001).
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discusses Cooper v. Harris,9 which the Court decided 16 years after
Easley. Cooper reveals how the Court repeated its failure in Easley by
holding that reapportioning congressional districts required racial
neutrality to promote nondiscrimination in an electoral democracy. Part III
argues that the Court should reject partisan gerrymandering because
partisanship has evolved into a proxy for maximizing racial bloc voting
patterns. Part IV concludes with a practical solution for courts to handle
gerrymandering cases by respecting conformity with traditional districting
principles, such as compactness and respect for county lines, as long as
those districts are established free of any partisan or racial considerations.
I. AMERICA IS CHALLENGED TO REEVALUATE AND PROTECT THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO VOTE AGAINST RACIAL TARGETING
A gerrymander represents a distortion of legislative district boundaries
and populations because of partisan politics or separate specific motives.10
Partisan political gerrymandering is expanding because discretionary
redistricting provides an opportunity for one political party to give itself
advantage over another political party.11 Those involved in legislative
redistricting typically implement two techniques to create a partisan
gerrymander: “packing” and “cracking.”12 The packing strategy “packs”
the opposing party’s supporters into a comparatively small number of
districts to help the opposing party win big majorities in a small number
of districts but lose a large majority of the districts.13 “Cracking” cracks or
rips the opposing party’s voters so badly that it virtually guarantees the
opposing party voters, although large in number, are an unsuccessful
minority party in all of the targeted districts.14
Partisan gerrymandering is particularly harmful for at least two
primary grounds.15 First, a partisan gerrymander is likely to permit a
political party possessing a minority of the popular vote to take command
over a majority of the seats in the state assembly, as well as its state’s
representatives in the House of Representatives.16 Second, a partisan
gerrymander is likely to permit “a party that possess only a slim majority
9. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017).
10. Michael E. Lewyn, How to Limit Gerrymandering, 45 FLA. L. REV. 403,
405 (1993).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 406.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 407.
16. Id.
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in popular vote over its main political challenger . . . to convert this slim
popular vote advantage into a tactical established ascendency.”17 Whether
a gerrymander establishes a majority party or disproportionately expands
the majority’s power when compared to the votes actually received, a
gerrymander unfairly risks establishing a partisan imbalance so expertly
that the legislature becomes indifferent to the desires of a changing voting
demographic.18
According to Bryan Sells, a civil rights lawyer in Atlanta, America is
in a new moment because this nation is “reevaluating the value of the right
to vote and of unrigged systems. It’s not because the system was less
rigged before. People are just caring about it more in the last five years.”19
The U.S. Supreme Court should hold that a state may not target AfricanAmerican voters in the election process for either racial or partisan
reasons.
In today’s politics, race and partisan political identity have evolved
into one. This nation has witnessed a 21st-century explosion of electionrelated targeting laws Republican-controlled legislatures adopted over the
opposition of both Democrats and civil rights supporters.20 Examples of
election-related targeting laws contested along partisan and racial lines
include a litany of Republican-sponsored voting restrictions, such as strict
voter ID laws, voter registration and early voting restraints, and the
treatment of provisional ballots.21 Democrats and civil rights groups attack
these Republican-sponsored restrictions because they unjustifiably
suppress involvement in the election process by a number of eligible racial
minority voters who usually support Democrats.22 Civil rights activists
correctly contend these 21st-century burdens on the right to vote
effectively deny racial minorities the right to vote by diluting their roles in
the electoral process.23 “Vote dilution” in the context of racial politics is
more than an absence of proportional representation; it does not occur
when elected officials fail to mirror on a proportional basis a racial group’s
voting potential ability.24 Plaintiffs in a voter dilution case must
demonstrate under the totality of the circumstances standard that the
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Jonsson, supra note 1.
20. Daniel P. Tokaji, Vote Dissociation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 761, 766 (2018).
21. Id. at 761.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 766–67.
24. Captain Frederick G. Slabach, Equal Justice: Applying the Voting Rights Act
to Judicial Elections, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 850 (1994) (citing White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973)) (identifying dilution under the Constitution).
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political processes involving the nomination and election were not equally
accessible to minority group involvement, attacking the process.25 A
minority group is required to show that its members do not have the same
opportunity as other groups to contribute to the political process and to
elect their preferred officials.26
Although Republicans implemented their vote-denial policies against
racial minorities, they also used their control over redistricting by
gerrymandering both the U.S. House of Representatives and state legislative
districts.27 Gerrymandering allows the controlling political party to entrench
itself in power by diluting votes cast for a rival party.28 For example, a
simple Republican gerrymandering strategy is to pack Democrats into a
small number of districts to create safe Republican majorities but
simultaneously pack African Americans—who, as a collective, consistently
vote for Democrats—inside a small number of districts which produces a
promising election map for Republicans.29 Racial-political polarization
helps to explain why Republican-dominated legislatures have racially
gerrymandered Congressional and state legislative districts to implement
majority-minority districts and effectively “dilute” the political impact of
minority votes.30 Racial gerrymandering is extremely challenging since it
dilutes the votes of racial minorities under contemporary America’s single
electoral practice for casting ballots for legislators.31 Because AfricanAmericans and Hispanics disproportionately reside in geographically
condensed inner cities without a proportional representation model, racial,
minority vote-dilution will continue to exist as an inherent feature of
American democracy.32
Since 2016, several federal courts have issued decisions finding that
states and localities practiced intentional discrimination in framing their
voting and election laws.33 Intentional discrimination assertions in the

25. Id. (citing White, 412 U.S. at 769).
26. Id.
27. Tokaji, supra note 20, at 767.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 768.
30. M. Akram Faizer, Reinforced Polarization: How the Roberts Court’s
Recent Decision to Invalidate the Voting Rights Act’s Coverage Formula Will
Exacerbate the Divisions That Bedevil U.S. Society, 45 CUMB. L. REV. 303, 325
(2014–15).
31. Id. at 326.
32. Id. at 327.
33. Danielle Lang & J. Gerald Hebert, A Post-Shelby Strategy: Exposing
Discriminatory Intent In Voting Rights Litigation, 127 YALE L.J. F. 779, 780
(2018) (citing Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d 216, 241 (5th Cir. 2016) (remanding a
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setting of voting rights litigation virtually always generate the issue of
disentangling race from party.34 Race and partisan connection are
repeatedly linked in modern politics, especially in the South.35 When race
and partisanship align, the usual state politician defense is that the
legislators are implementing their plans for predominantly partisan
purposes with only incidental race-based motives.36 Because of the strong
link between partisan politics and race-based politics, the Supreme Court
has held that to succeed in a racial gerrymandering case in which race and
party truly correlate, the plaintiffs must demonstrate that race, not partisan
politics, was the predominant motive.37 Courts should reject partisan
motives as a proxy defense for targeting African-Americans, as well as
other minority voters, to create marginalization in the political process.38
Racial targeting to marginalize voters is intentional discrimination
even if that marginalization was driven primarily by a political scheme and
not racial hostility.39 The Fourth Circuit asserted: “Using race as a proxy
for party may be an effective way to win an election. But intentionally
targeting a particular race’s access to the franchise because its members

discriminatory purpose finding regarding Texas’s strict photo ID law, but holding
that “there remains evidence to support a finding that the cloak of ballot integrity
could be hiding a more invidious purpose”); Terrebonne Par. Branch NAACP v.
Jindal, 2017 WL 3574878 (M.D. La. Aug. 17, 2017) (finding that the at-large
voting system for election of judges was maintained for a discriminatory purpose);
Patino v. City of Pasadena, 230 F. Supp. 3d 667 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding that
the City of Pasadena, Texas, intentionally discriminated against Latino voters in
changing its city governance structure); Perez v. Abbott, 2017 WL 1787454
(W.D. Tex. May 2, 2017) (holding that the Texas Legislature intentionally
discriminated against Latino voters in drawing the 2011 congressional
redistricting plan); One Wis. Inst. v. Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 925 (W.D.
Wis. 2016) (finding that Wisconsin’s restrictions on in-person absentee voting
were motivated by discriminatory intent)).
34. Id. at 788.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Veasey, 830 F.3d at 303 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“The law
reflects party politics, not racism, and the majority of this court—in their hearts—
know this.”)).
37. Id. (citing Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001)). See, e.g., Richard
L. Hasen, Race or Party, Race as Party, or Party All the Time: Three Uneasy
Approaches to Conjoined Polarization in Redistricting and Voting Cases, 59 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1837 (2018).
38. Lang & Hebert, supra note 33, at 788.
39. See id.
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vote for a particular party, in a predictable manner, constitutes
discriminatory purpose.”40
Since the partisan gerrymandering evolution is virtually indistinguishable
from racial gerrymandering, the Supreme Court should put an end to them
both to breathe new life into the equal protection concept and promote
electoral democracy in America.
II. RACE IS TOO SENSITIVE A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN
LEGISLATIVE GERRYMANDERING
North Carolina has continued to encounter the intersection of race and
partisan gerrymandering. In 1993, in a North Carolina case, Justice
O’Connor appropriately interpreted the meaning of the constitutional right
to vote and the correctness of race-based state legislation designed to
benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups as
two very complex and sensitive issues that continue to appear before the
Supreme Court.41 Because of the 1990 census, North Carolina was entitled
to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. The North Carolina
General Assembly passed a reapportionment strategy that contained one
majority-black congressional district.42 After the Attorney General of the
United States objected to the plan under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 (“VRA” or “Act”), the General Assembly approved new legislation
establishing a second majority-black district.43 In the 1993 North Carolina
case of Shaw v. Reno, the plaintiffs raised the complicated issue of whether
a modified race-conscious redistricting plan and district boundary lines
create an unconstitutional racial gerrymander.44 A review of the North
Carolina litigation odyssey supports the argument that race is too sensitive
a factor—because of its historical baggage—to be a factor in the context
of partisan gerrymandering.
A. Easley v. Cromartie
Easley is the descendant of Shaw I.45 In Shaw I, the Court held that
proof of North Carolina’s drawing of district boundaries for race-based
40. Id. (quoting N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204,
222 (4th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017)); One Wis. Inst. v.
Thomsen, 198 F. Supp. 3d 896, 925 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
41. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633 (1993).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 633–34.
45. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 237 (2001).
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reasons could establish that the legislature violated the Equal Protection
Clause.46 In Easley, the Supreme Court reviewed and rejected a threejudge district court’s decision that the North Carolina Legislature used
race as the predominant factor in drawing its 12th Congressional District’s
boundaries.47 The Court found the district court’s findings clearly
erroneous and reversed the lower court’s conclusion that North Carolina
violated the Equal Protection Clause.48
This racial districting litigation appeared before the Supreme Court
four times, and each time the Court failed to get it right. The Court’s first
two rulings focused on North Carolina’s old 12th Congressional District,
one of two North Carolina congressional districts containing a majority of
African-American voters.49 The Court held that an equal protection
violation may exist in the drawing of a legislative boundary that is raceneutral on its face if that boundary drawing is only rationally understood
as a plan to isolate voters into individual districts because of their race, and
there is no adequate justification for that racial isolation.50
In Easley and its three predecessors involving the North Carolina
Legislature’s use of race as a factor in drawing congressional districts’
boundaries, the Court’s holdings were wrong because race should never
be used as a factor when a legislature gerrymanders boundaries.51 The
Court should reconsider its suggestion in gerrymandering that race may be
used as a factor in drawing district boundaries as long as it is not a
predominant factor52 because using race as a factor is simply unworkable
in gerrymandering cases. Patricia Okonta supports the position that racial
gerrymandering occurs in redistricting when state legislators approve
reapportionment plans to “stack, crack, or pack clusters of minority voters
in single-member district systems.”53 According to Okonta, civil rights
advocates have utilized non-race-neutral redistricting plans to empower
disenfranchised minorities to choose by ballot their desired candidates, but

46. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1.
47. Easley, 532 U.S. 234.
48. Id. at 237; see U.S. CONST. amend. IX, § 1.
49. Easley, 532 U.S. at 237; see Shaw, 509 U.S. 630; Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S.
899 (1996).
50. Easley, 532 U.S. at 237–38.
51. Id. at 238.
52. Id.
53. Patricia Okonta, Race-Based Political Exclusion And Social Subjugation:
Racial Gerrymandering As A Badge Of Slavery, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
254, 255 (quoting STEVEN A. LIGHT, “THE LAW IS GOOD”: THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, REDISTRICTING AND BLACK REGIME POLITICS 22 (2010)).
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new plans have been applied to achieve the opposite goal.54 Those new
plans may use racial gerrymandering to exploit racially polarized voting
to reduce minorities’ potential to elect a preferred candidate.55 Since the
Supreme Court prohibits public school officials from admitting students
to public schools using race as a factor, then, by analogy, North Carolina
should not be allowed to set district boundaries by using race as a factor,
since the way to accomplish legislative redistricting without considering
race56 is to stop establishing district boundaries by using race as a factor.57
Under the Supreme Court’s big-picture, race-neutral rationale as
articulated in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District, the way to stop gerrymandering discrimination in redistricting
boundaries is to stop using race as a factor in drawing those boundaries.58
In Shaw II, the Court likewise reversed a three-judge district court
decision that held that the boundary-drawing law in question did not
violate the Constitution.59 The Court found that the district’s
“predominately African-American racial makeup, and its history, together
demonstrated an intentional plan to create a ‘majority-black’ district” in
which race was the predominant factor in designing the district and the
district boundaries were not “designed to ‘protec[t] Democrat
incumbents.’”60 The Court’s conclusion in Shaw II was correct in that the
Constitution was violated,61 but the Court’s belief that race could
justifiably be a factor in legislative gerrymandering should be rejected as
impractical. Any consideration of race taints the equality principle in the
gerrymandering process and obstructs the goal of representative
democracy.62
The Court’s third holding focused on a newly redrawn North Carolina
12th Congressional District.63 A three-judge district court,64 with one
judge dissenting, granted summary judgment to those challenging the

54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
747–48 (2007).
57. Id. at 748.
58. Id.
59. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 238 (2001).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Contra id.
63. Id. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
64. Harris S. Ammerman, Three Judge Courts: See How They Run!, 52 F.R.D.
293 (1971) (“Three-judge courts hear injunction cases alleging unconstitutionally
of federal or state statutes.”).
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congressional district’s boundaries.65 The federal district court held that
the North Carolina Legislature had once again used criteria that, on its
face, focused on race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.66 The
federal district court grounded its decision on substantial facts revealing
that the boundaries established an abnormally designed district—the
boundaries divided counties as well as cities.67 The facts also highlighted
that the new congressional district contained virtually all the Democraticregistered, largely African-American, voting precincts but placed
Democratic-registered, largely white precincts, outside the district.68 The
North Carolina Legislature’s relocation of the predominately white
precincts outside the 12th Congressional District is reliable evidence that
the legislative goal was to maximize the new 12th District’s AfricanAmerican voting power and not simply to maximize the district’s voting
power for Democrats.69
Upon Supreme Court review, in its third holding, the Court again
rejected the district court’s holding that North Carolina’s 12th District was
shaped the way it was because of race.70 The Court failed to recognize that
the North Carolina Legislature was preoccupied with the racial makeup of
the district and not the relatively secondary partisan nature of the district.71
The Court rejected the district court’s position that the new 12th
Congressional District’s appearance, the manner in which it divided towns
and counties, and its largely African-American voting population, should
have allowed the plaintiffs to prevail in the case.72 All of these activities
show a preoccupation with the racial makeup of the district, not the
secondary effects of partisan politics.73
Evidence of the shape of a district united with the evidence of AfricanAmerican Democratic registration is sufficient to demonstrate, on
summary judgment, the unconstitutional race-based taint, because only a
preoccupation with race can reasonably explain the redistricting plan.74
The Supreme Court conceded that race was a significant factor in North
Carolina’s redistricting plan, but, unfortunately, the Court concluded there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the evidence was
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Easley, 532 U.S. at 238.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 238–39.
Id.
Contra id. at 239.
Id. at 238–39.
Contra id.
Contra id.
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consistent with the constitutional partisan objective of producing a safe
Democratic seat.75
The Court’s third holding was ill-advised because it failed to realize
that the government should never utilize race as a factor in gerrymandering
a legislative district. Any use of race in shaping a congressional or
legislative district fatally taints the equal protection standard and blocks
free and fair elections in America. The Court should have adopted the
position that it is never permissible to use race as a factor in redistricting
a congressional district because true voting equality requires using raceneutral traditional demographics and prohibiting the use of partisan
politics while redistricting.76
The Court’s fourth consideration of North Carolina’s redistricting
scheme in Easley v. Cromartie from an equal protection perspective
demonstrated that it is virtually impossible to reliably measure the race
factor while a state is engaging in a congressional gerrymandering
process.77 The record contained little evidence supporting the district
court’s conclusion that the 12th Congressional District plan only
considered race as a minor factor since the relevant evidence included
Senator Cooper’s declaration that racial balancing was a primary goal of
redistricting a new 12th District and not democratic partisan concerns.78
In a North Carolina racial gerrymandering case, the Supreme Court
failed to follow the clearly erroneous standard for factual finding by
declaring, “The evidence taken together, however, does not show that
racial considerations predominated in the drawing of District 12’s
boundaries. That is because race in this case correlates closely with
political behavior.”79 According to Justice Thomas, the only proper issue
for the Supreme Court to consider regarding North Carolina’s new 12th
Congressional District was whether the district court’s factual conclusion
that race was the predominant factor was clearly erroneous.80
Justice Thomas rejected the majority’s conclusion about the trial
court’s decision regarding the predominant purpose of the 12th District
gerrymandering plan.81 In dissent, Justice Thomas said that because the
district court’s conclusion that race was the predominant factor motivating
the North Carolina Legislature constituted a factual finding, the Supreme
Court could not overturn the district court’s factual finding unless it was
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Contra id.
Contra id.
Contra id. at 257.
Contra id.
Contra id.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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clearly erroneous.82 Thomas reminded the Court that an intentional
discrimination determination is a conclusion of fact.83 He stated: “Where
there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder’s choice
between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”84 According to Justice
Thomas, when the Court conceded that the evidence reasonably pointed to
either a partisan or racial motive for creating the new 12th District under
the Court’s precedent, the district court’s decision simply could not be
clearly erroneous.85 The Supreme Court should reject the district court’s
conclusion of facts only if it possesses an unambiguous and well-founded
belief that an error was made.86
In this most recent iteration of the North Carolina congressional
districts, the basic equal protection question the Court avoided was
whether the Constitution should prohibit the North Carolina Legislature in
establishing the new 12th District’s boundaries from considering either
race or partisanship as factors, because our Constitution has evolved to
race and partisan neutrality in gerrymandering.87 In a case involving the
gerrymandering of districts, because racial identification often correlates
to partisan political affiliation, the person attacking the legislatively drawn
boundaries should only be required to prove that the state used race or
partisanship as a factor to prove an illegitimate violation of the equal
protection principle.88 When race or partisanship is not a factor in
establishing congressional redistricting, the legislature acts consistently
with necessary race-neutral and partisan-neutral redistricting principles.89
The Court should reverse its decision in Easley that allows race to be
a factor in gerrymandering legislative boundaries when a partisan motive
is also equally plausible.90 The Court should abandon its rationale in
Easley and declare the fundamental principle that, like unconstitutional
racial discrimination in public school education, using race as a factor in
gerrymandering legislative districts is a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.91 The Court should also proclaim that all federal, state, and local
laws requiring or permitting the use of race as a factor in congressional
82. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)).
85. Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
86. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co.,
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
87. See id. at 257.
88. Contra id. at 258.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 234.
91. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Kan., 349 U.S. 294, 298 (1955).
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redistricting must yield to the race neutrality principle.92 Future
gerrymandering cases applying the race neutrality principle or a partisanneutral concept to establish congressional boundaries will present
opportunities for the Court to consider the manner in which it will accord
relief.93
Since the issue being appealed in Easley was an evidentiary question
of fact,94 the only relevant issue before the appellate court under the proposed
race-neutral or partisan-neutral gerrymandering standard should be whether
there is plausible factual evidence to support the district court’s conclusion
that race or partisanship was a factor, regardless of whether North Carolina’s
legislative motive was predominantly political and not racial.95 In making its
evidentiary determination, the Court followed its flawed burden of proof
required in gerrymandering cases alleging racial discrimination in Shaw I and
later cases.96 Under current case law, in a situation involving a racial
gerrymandering, the burden of proof is on the plaintiffs who claim that a
legislature has improperly used race as a factor to produce a majorityminority district.97 The gerrymandering plaintiffs must prove the
“legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to
racial considerations.”98 The Court should abandon its current case law
involving gerrymandering and hold that a successful plaintiff challenging
the use of race as a factor while gerrymandering must only prove that true
race neutral principles were utilized, which would prohibit any
consideration of race as a factor.
Despite the Supreme Court’s racially tainted gerrymandering
precedents, race should not be a permissible motivating factor when a
legislature draws a majority-minority district under the equal protection
principle.99 The Court requires plaintiffs in a gerrymandering case to prove
that race was the predominant factor motivating a legislature districting
decision.100 A correct reading of the equal protection principle in a
gerrymandering case would require the plaintiff to prove only that race is
a factor, not that it is the predominant factor, to establish an Equal
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Easley, 532 U.S. at 241.
95. Contra id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995)).
99. Contra id.; contra Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
100. Contra Easley, 532 U.S. at 241 (quoting Miller, 515 U.S. at 916); contra
Vera, 517 U.S. at 959 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Protection Clause violation. If a plaintiff proves that one cannot rationalize
a facially neutral law with any justifications except race,101 the plaintiff
has implicitly proved by circumstantial evidence that race is an
unacceptable tainted factor.102 The African-American experience reveals
that when race is a factor in gerrymandering of congressional districts, race
virtually always becomes a tainted predominating factor. The only way to
assure that the legislature utilizes race-neutral redistricting principles is to
prohibit the legislature from giving any consideration to race or partisan
politics in the gerrymandering process.103
B. Cooper v. Harris
In Cooper v. Harris, Justice Kagan declared that the U.S. Constitution
delegates the task of establishing congressional districts to the states.104 It
is the author’s belief that an appropriate reading of the Constitution,
however, would prohibit the use of race as a factor in redistricting those
congressional districts.105 The Court has consistently held, “[a] State may
not use race as the predominant factor in drawing district lines unless it
has a compelling reason”;106 a state should never be allowed, however, to
use race as a factor in establishing congressional district lines under any
circumstances. Any consideration of race in the redistricting process is an
unreasonable separate-but-equal poison pill.107
Cooper involved North Carolina’s latest redrawing of two
congressional districts, both of which have historically contained a
substantial number of black voters.108 In its present incarnation, District 1
is anchored in northeastern North Carolina, with attachments extending
both south and west—the west into Durham.109 District 12 starts in southcentral North Carolina, which includes a large section of Charlotte, and
next journeys northeast, zig-zagging much of the way to North Carolina’s
northern border.110 The two districts have quite a history before the

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Contra Easley, 532 U.S. at 241–42.
Contra id. at 242.
Id.
Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1463 (2017).
Contra id.
Id.
Contra id.
Id. at 1466.
Id.
Id.
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Supreme Court.111 The Supreme Court first encountered the 1992 versions
of the two districts in Shaw v. Reno.112
In Cooper, a three-judge district court held that North Carolina
officials violated the Equal Protection Clause because they considered race
as the predominant factor when the state redistricted the two districts in
which the voting-age populations were majority black.113 The Supreme
Court correctly affirmed the district court’s conclusion that North Carolina
violated the equal protection principle; the Court’s rationale for the
violation, however, is unacceptable. The Court should reject its prior
precedents and hold that North Carolina’s redistricting plan violates the
equal protection principle if the legislature gives any consideration to race.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, properly
understood, should prohibit any consideration of race as a factor when a
state gerrymanders its congressional districts.114 The equal protection
principle prevents a state from utilizing race as a factor to justify
separating its citizens into different voting districts.115 When a voter sues
state officials for drawing district lines and considering race as a factor,
the Court should apply a simple and manageable, one-step analysis.116 The
challenger to the redistricting plan should have to prove race is a factor
influencing the legislature’s determination to locate a substantial number
of voters inside or outside of a specific district.117 If a challenger
demonstrates that, despite the use of other traditional factors such as
compactness or respect for political subdivisions, any consideration of
race in gerrymandering creates a partisan advantage violating the equal
protection principle.118 The challenger’s proof of race as a factor could
consist of “direct evidence” of legislative purpose or circumstantial
evidence. Circumstantial evidence includes the district’s appearance and
demographics, which only a consideration of the race factor can

111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
113. Id.
114. Contra id.
115. Contra Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 797 (2017).
116. Contra Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463.
117. Contra Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
118. Contra Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1463–64. “[R]equiring districts be compact .
. . [is] overrated. With the exception of it . . . usefulness as an indicia of . . .
gerrymandering, I do not believe there is anything desirable . . . about districts that
look like squares. . . . [I]t is rare . . . to find regular geometric figures . . . , while
satisfying equal population constraints.” Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting:
A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77, 90–91 (1985).
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reasonably explain.119 Because racial considerations in reality are virtually
never subordinate to other considerations in the design of the district, the
Court should prohibit any use of race in the gerrymandering process.120
Once the challenger proves that race was a factor in the design of a
legislative district, the challenger should prevail because the equal
protection principle of fair and equal representation for all voters prohibits
the state from using race as a factor in the sorting of voters to serve even
a supposed “compelling interest” that is allegedly “narrowly tailored” to
achieve that goal.121
The Court should reject its long-held assumption that race may be a
factor under its compelling interest rationale to comply with operative
provisions of the VRA122 in favor of a true race-neutral approach, which
strictly prohibits any consideration of race. Two provisions of the VRA—
§§ 2 and 5—were considered in Cooper.123 Section 2 makes a paradigm,
practice, or procedure that produces an exclusion or abridgement of the
right to vote because of race unlawful.124 Unlike § 2, prior to the Court’s
canceling of § 5’s coverage formula, § 5 mandated specific states, as well
as several counties in North Carolina, to pre-clear voting adjustments or
amendments with the Department of Justice to preempt a deterioration in
the voting capacity of racial minorities.125 The government should give all
Americans the opportunity to elect their preferred candidate, regardless of
race, because race should never be a factor to enhance or dilute a specific
group’s chance to elect their preferred candidate.126
A state should not be allowed to invoke the VRA to support race-based
districting because litigation experience provides strong evidence that the
statute must now require race neutrality by all the relevant actors to avoid
laying a trap for an unwary legislature.127 If a legislature uses race as a
factor in its redistricting plan, a court may reject “its redistricting plan as
either (1) unconstitutional racial gerrymandering should the legislature
place a few too many minority voters in a district or (2) retrogressive under
§ 5 should the legislature place a few too few.”128 If the legislature is
119. Contra Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
120. Contra Bethune-Hill, 137 S. Ct. at 800.
121. Contra Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
122. Contra id. (citing Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, amended by 52 U.S.C. §
10301–14); contra Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996) (Shaw II).
123. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
124. Id.
125. Id. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976).
126. Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1464.
127. Contra Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015).
128. Id.
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prohibited from giving any consideration to race in the gerrymandering
process, it would not have to worry about the trap of trying to decide how
much race consideration is too much and how much race consideration is
not enough.129 If legislative reapportionment could not use race as a factor
to dilute or enhance a group’s voting power, the state now has “good
reasons” under the Act to design a single district line with a reduced
reliance on partisan politics.130 The “strong basis” for “race conscious
reasons” typically gives states breathing room to implement fake raceconscious compliance measures that produce foreseeable racial
discrimination in the electoral process at the expense of cross-racial
coalition building in the reapportionment process.131 Professor Lani Guinier
has described cross-racial coalition building as involving a situation in
which a person is not confined to a minority outlook and a person is certainly
not abandoned because of the outlook selected.132
The Supreme Court still retains full power to correct and reverse its
understanding of the law and adopt this recommended analysis by
requiring complete race neutrality in legislative reapportionment cases.
Under this analysis and the proposed constitutional standard, any American
court’s findings of fact that a racial consideration was a factor in drawing
district lines makes that district unconstitutional. As Justice Thomas
observed, “Because racial gerrymandering offends the Constitution whether
the motivation is malicious or benign. It is not a defense that the legislature
merely may have drawn the district based on the stereotype that blacks are
reliable Democratic voters.”133 By continuing to use race as a predominant
factor in the politics of gerrymandering, America’s opportunity for a
growing and inclusive democracy diminishes.
III. BOTH PARTISAN AND RACIAL GERRYMANDERING SHOULD BE
REJECTED BECAUSE THERE IS NO REASONABLE WAY TO DISTINGUISH
BETWEEN THE TWO
Intentional discrimination claims in situations involving gerrymandering
produce difficulty in separating race from partisan politics.134 When race and
129. Contra id.
130. Contra id.
131. Contra Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788, 802
(2017).
132. LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 16 (1994).
133. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 266–67 (2001) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
134. Lang & Hebert, supra note 33, at 788 (citing Veasey v. Abbott, 830 F.3d
216, 303 (5th Cir. 2016) (Jones, J., dissenting) (“The law reflects party politics,
not racism, and the majority of this court—in their hearts—know this.”)).
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partisan politics are linked to gerrymandering “as they so often do in modern
politics, particularly in the South—a common defense is that the legislators
acted for partisan reasons, not for race-based ones.”135 Since the Supreme
Court has failed to develop any manageable objective standards to separate
partisan motives from racial motives in gerrymandering cases, the Court
should abandon its current requirement that to succeed in a racial
gerrymandering case, in which race and party closely correlate, the plaintiffs
must be able to show that race, not partisan politics, was the predominant
motive.136 The Court should instead adopt the position that, to prevail, a
plaintiff must prove only that race was a factor in the partisan redistricting
gerrymandering process.
A. Partisan Politics as an Illegitimate Defense Where Race Is a Factor in
Legislative Redistricting
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identified the
problem in utilizing race as a factor in a partisan gerrymandering case.137
The Fourth Circuit’s approach to gerrymandering, although appropriate,
may not effectively discourage those legislators who present partisan
motives as an affirmative defense for racially targeting minority voters.138
The Fourth Circuit’s holding that those who raise partisan political
motives to justify targeting black and minority voters for exclusion from
the political process by gerrymander is, without a reasonable doubt,
discriminatory.139 By analogy, it should be equally true under the rationale
of the Fourth Circuit that a court should treat the targeting of AfricanAmericans or racial minorities when redistricting congressional districts
even if inspired by a political scheme and not racial animus as
discriminatory.140 Under the rationale of the Fourth Circuit, exploiting race
as a proxy for party may successfully redistrict the legislature to prevail in
an election, but it is not a fair way to protect or promote equal
representation.141 To intentionally target a particular race, however, and
place them in a legislative district while redistricting because its members
vote for a certain party, in an expected routine, establishes discriminatory
purpose. The Fourth Circuit did not unequivocally declare that race is an
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; N.C. State Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1399 (2017).
138. See supra note 137.
139. See supra note 137.
140. See supra note 137.
141. See supra note 137.
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impermissible factor in either partisan or racial gerrymandering because
targeting African-American and other racial minority voters for
marginalization in the political process is discriminatory even if the
motivating factor is predominantly partisan rather than racially hostile.142
A more progressive Fourth Circuit decision would have asserted that
exploiting race as a proxy for political advantage is not an acceptable way
to win an election because any use of race under the circumstances is a
divisive poison pill that harms representative democracy. The Fourth
Circuit should have prohibited the legislature from intentionally using race
in the reapportionment process, even for a predominately partisan motive,
because to do so demeans those adversely affected.143
Completely removing race and partisan advantage as factors from
redistricting law provides structural and institutional certainty under a
different equal protection analysis that is completely race neutral.144 When
state actors violate clear rules that prohibit the consideration of either the
race factor or partisan advantage, judges using other traditional equal
protection principles should become very predictable.145 According to
Gary Michael Parsons, predictability by judges addressing the partisan
politics issue represents good public policy because it helps to shield the
dispensation of redistricting justice from claims of unfair partisanship.146
Redistricting law should utilize other traditional equal protection
principles to prohibit the use of either race or partisan political advantage.
In a situation involving partisan or racial gerrymandering, the Court should
embrace equitable principles that absolutely prohibit any consideration of
race or political advantage when enacting a redistricting plan.147
The Court’s usual treatment of partisan gerrymandering under equitable
principles avoids any commitment to racial neutrality under equal protection
principles but, at the same time, accommodates racial or partisan
stereotyping.148 The Supreme Court attacks the government’s invidious
racial discrimination, yet the Court inconsistently and incoherently accepts
partisan gerrymanders as a defense in racial gerrymandering litigation,149
142. See supra note 137.
143. See Lang & Hebert, supra note 33, at 788 (citing N.C. State Conference of
NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 224 (4th Cir. 2016)).
144. See Gary Michael Parsons, Jr., The Institutional Case For Partisan
Gerrymandering Claim, 2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 166 (2017).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 166–67 (citing North Carolina v. Covington, 137 S. Ct. 1624
(2017)).
148. See id. at 167.
149. Id. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 551 (1999).
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and the Court rejects plaintiffs’ allegations that partisan politics represent a
very thinly disguised pretext for racial gerrymandering.150 If partisan
gerrymandering can accommodate the race factor as legitimate, then
partisan gerrymandering under the equal protection principle may also
prohibit the use of the race factor as illegitimate because partisan politics
is so easily manipulated as a tool for racial targeting.151 For instance,
following the last census, legislators sorted voters by race with a pretext
of serving a legitimate constitutional purpose—prohibiting racial vote
dilution—but actually achieving an unconstitutional predominant purpose
of racial targeting by calling it a partisan vote advantage effort.152
If the Supreme Court wants to establish certainty in the redistricting
process, the Court should prohibit any consideration of partisan politics in
the gerrymandering process. The Court should also deny the states the
power to use partisan politics to defend racial targeting in redistricting
cases.153 An equal protection analysis prohibiting any consideration of race
or partisan politics “would begin to fill the doctrinal gap in redistricting
jurisprudence and help bring certainty to legislators navigating the”154
redistricting process. Both partisan-neutral politics and race-neutral
redistricting practices help to promote the goal of allowing redistricting
law to become analytically consistent, predictable, and not as likely to be
exposed to either partisan or racial manipulation by legislators or
litigants.155 Predictability in how the Court will rule in a gerrymandering
case will not work until the Court is prepared to hold that consideration of
either partisan politics or race is prohibited in the gerrymandering process.
B. Redistricting’s Legitimate Goal Is Fair Representation
Gerrymandering became a significant issue in the 2018 midterm
elections.156 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court redrew the state’s GOP-

150. See Parsons, Jr., supra note 144, at 167. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267, 287 (2004).
151. See Parsons, Jr., supra note 144, at 167.
152. See id. at 168 (citing Justin Levitt, Quick and Dirty: The New Misreading
of the Voting Rights Act, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 573, 609 (2016)).
153. See id. at 169.
154. Id. at 171.
155. Id. at 174 (citations omitted).
156. Ari Berman, Five myths about gerrymandering, WASH. POST (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/five-myths/five-myths-aboutgerrymandering/2018/03/08/f9d1a230-2241-11e8-badd-7c9f29a55815_story.html
[https://perma.cc/J7ND-AYF5].
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controlled congressional map.157 According to one commentator,
Democrats would have gained approximately 37 Congressional House
seats in the 2018 midterm elections.158 While Democrats actually accrued
39 seats,159 the total seats for Democrats could have been larger but for
Republican gerrymandering in particular states.160 A contrast between the
2018 House election outcomes in North Carolina and Pennsylvania
demonstrate the capacity of gerrymandering to distort the number of
legislative seats that a specific political party won based on the percentage
of statewide popular votes received in a given election.161
Christopher Ingraham demonstrates why partisan gerrymandering
matters by contrasting the results in North Carolina and Pennsylvania in
light of Pennsylvania prohibiting extreme partisan gerrymandering in the
2018 midterm elections, while North Carolina continued to embrace the
same.162
During the 2016 national elections, Democrats in North Carolina
earned a 47% proportion of the statewide ballots cast for the House seats,
but Democrats were awarded only a 23% proportion of the seats as a result
of extreme partisan legislative redistricting.163 In Pennsylvania, Democrats
earned a 48% proportion of the ballots cast in the state for House elections
with opponents; nonetheless, the Pennsylvania Democrats received 27%
of the seats.164 Ingraham contends that “[b]ig differences between popular
votes and seat totals are one of the telltale signs of a heavily
gerrymandered state. But the two states’ paths diverged after 2016.”165
North Carolina used its gerrymandered districts during the 2018
midterm election.166 In Pennsylvania, the state supreme court redrew the
maps earlier in 2018 to prohibit extreme partisan gerrymandering.167 The
157. Id.
158. Christopher Ingraham, One state fixed its gerrymandered districts, the
other didn’t. Here’s how the election played out in both, WASH. POST (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/11/09/one-state-fixed-its
-gerrymandered-districts-other-didnt-heres-how-election-played-out-both/?nore
direct=on&utm_term=.91b1e04efbe1 [http://perma.cc/CTJ5-REVH].
159. Forecasting the race for the House, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, https://projects
.fivethirtyeight.com/2018-midterm-election-forecast/house/ [http://perma.cc/5A4
2-U5K4] (last updated Nov. 6, 2018).
160. Ingraham, supra note 158.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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difference between extreme partisan gerrymandering and eliminating or
reducing the effect of gerrymandering in the ballot box outcome is eyecatching but very predictable.168 Since North Carolina retained its old
maps of 2016, it achieved an electoral result in 2018 that was virtually
identical to that of 2016.169 Although there was a Democratic wave in
North Carolina where more than half of voters cast a ballot for a
Democratic House candidate, North Carolina Democrats received only a
quarter of the seats with opposition.170 Ingraham said, in Pennsylvania, “a
53 percent majority in the popular vote yielded a hair under half of the
contested seats — a big difference from 2016, when 48 percent of the vote
gave Democrats 27 percent of the seats.”171
The author of this Article believes the different congressional election
outcomes in North Carolina and Pennsylvania provide realistic optic
perceptions regarding how the gerrymandering process operates.172 A
great deal of the misconception about how the current gerrymandering
process operates, however, may be linked to the fact that the Court has
failed to establish identifiable or manageable standards for separating
partisan politics from racial targeting of voters.173
The government should reject partisan gerrymandering and racial
gerrymandering when redistricting to advance the democratic goal of fair
representation and to prevent the return to the historical British practice of
providing no real representation for Americans, because the British did not
allow the Americans to have any input in the actual governing of their
colony.174 A combination of partisan gerrymandering and using race as a
factor pose a grave risk of placing targeted racial minority voters in
legislative districts without any meaningful representation because voter
dilution results in a lack of opportunity to provide input in selecting leaders
in their districts.175
Although the Supreme Court has historically left redistricting to the
states, the Court has the authority to revise state legislative redistricting
plans to assure fair and equal representation under the rationale of the
Court’s 1962 decision in Baker v. Carr.176 In Baker, Justice William
Brennan acknowledged that the Court has a judicial duty to assure fair and
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Berman, supra note 156.
Id.
See id.
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Berman, supra note 156.
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equal representation to all people when legislative redistricting occurs
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.177
Justice Brennan’s declaration in the 1960s laid the foundation for plaintiffs
to challenge legislative redistricting plans that fail to provide voters with
equal representation in the legislative branch of government.178 The
Supreme Court used the equal protection power established in Baker to
prohibit unequal representation in legislative redistricting inspired by any
consideration of either race or partisan politics.179
Under the rationale of Baker,180 the Court should use its power to
prohibit the use of the race factor in redistricting because the link between
partisan political identity and racial targeting typically stereotypes and
unfairly dilutes the vote of a racial minority. According to Donald Earl
Collins, American history reveals that because race continues to identify
where many Americans live as well as how many Americans vote,
politicians continue to gerrymander voting districts in at least two states
by playing the race card, because race significantly impacts almost every
aspect of a person’s life in America.181
A racial gerrymander occurs if race, rather than traditional criteria,
such as recognizing city and county boundaries or attempting to shield an
identifiable political party’s candidate from losing an election, is the
“predominant factor” as to why the legislature established certain
geographical lines without providing a compelling justification for giving
so much deference to race.182
The 2017 North Carolina case of Cooper v. Harris involved two North
Carolina congressional districts, District 1 and District 12.183 North
Carolina justified its redistricting plan on the theory that the disputed
congressional districts were established for partisan political purposes and

177. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
178. See Berman, supra note 156.
179. Id.
180. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 226.
181. Donald Earl Collins, Black history is U.S. history — but some of my
students don’t want to hear it, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/02/07/black-history-is-u-s-history
-but-some-of-my-students-dont-want-to-hear-it/ [https://perma.cc/VJH2-E537].
182. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court may just have given voting rights
activists a powerful new tool, WASH. POST (May 22, 2017), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/opinions/voting-rights-activists-should-love-todays-supreme-court
-ruling/2017/05/22/9443d726-3f2f-11e7-9869-bac8b446820a_story.html [https:/
/perma.cc/HJ55-9E2Q] (originally titled “Kagan quietly declares war on
gerrymandering”).
183. Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1465 (2017).
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not racial purposes.184 The two congressional districts were designed to
benefit Republicans, North Carolina contended, not to redistribute white
and black voters.185 Since North Carolina knew the Supreme Court had
never invalidated a gerrymandered district that articulated a plausible
appearance of a partisan gerrymander, it was necessary for the state to
articulate that this was partisan politics and not race to survive a legal
challenge.186 Professor Richard L. Hasen, the chancellor’s professor of law
and political science at the University of California at Irvine and the author
of Plutocrats United, believes some of the statements Associate Justice
Elena Kagan made in the Cooper187 opinion demonstrate the problematic
nature of the intersection of partisan politics and the race factor.188 Justice
Kagan asserted, “[W]hen it comes to drawing congressional districts, race
and party are not necessarily separate categories.”189 Hasen thinks Justice
Kagan believes “the sorting of voters on the grounds of their race remains
suspect even if race is meant to function as a proxy for other, including
political, characteristics.”190 Although Justice Kagan’s views are a step in
the right direction, they do not go far enough, because neither race nor
partisan politics should be considered as a factor in redistricting. When
redistricting of congressional districts is involved, race and partisan
politics are often not separate categories, and there is no principled way to
distinguish partisan political gerrymandering from racial gerrymandering
under the equal protection of the law.191
CONCLUSION
Determining whether the design of a congressional district is
motivated by either a racial or partisan reason poses a virtually impossible
challenge for a federal court.192 If the U.S. Supreme Court continues to
allow fake partisan political advantage to be a factor in deciding
redistricting cases alleging a real racial gerrymander, virtually everyone
will raise the fake-partisan-politics defense.193 The prestige of the Supreme
Court is at risk if it is perceived as endorsing either a fake-partisan-politics
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Hasen, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.
Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1455.
Hasen, supra note 182.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See Cooper, 137 S. Ct. at 1473.
Id.
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claim to provide cover for racial targeting in redistricting or permitting
partisan political advantage to exist at the expense of fair representation in
the nation’s congressional districts.
The most practical way for the Supreme Court to make progress in
situations involving redistricting is by respecting conformity to traditional
districting principles, such as compactness and respect for county lines as
long as those districts are established free of partisan politics or racial
considerations.194 The government should delete race and partisan politics
from redistricting because political and racial reasons are capable of
yielding similar oddities that block a district’s ability to produce fair
representation within its boundaries.195 The similar results, which block
the goal of fair representation in our democracy, exist because racial
identification is interrelated to political involvement.196 As a result of these
highly correlated redistricting realities, the Supreme Court has a
formidable task of instructing lower courts in gerrymandering cases to
engage in “a sensitive inquiry” into all “circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent” to assess whether the plaintiff can simply prove that either race
or partisanship was a factor in establishing a district’s lines.197 As soon as
possible, the Court should prohibit the use of race and partisan politics as
factors in redistricting because the secondary effects produced by both
unnecessarily obstruct the democratic goal of fair representation in
Congress and state legislative houses.

194. See id.
195. See id. (citing Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243 (2001)).
196. Id.
197. Contra id. (quoting Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

